Open voiting in Prussia and Denmark: or: the complexity of comparision. Some Post-Rokkanian reflections by Elklit, Jorgen
www.ssoar.info
Open voiting in Prussia and Denmark: or: the
complexity of comparision. Some Post-Rokkanian
reflections
Elklit, Jorgen
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Elklit, J. (1985). Open voiting in Prussia and Denmark: or: the complexity of comparision. Some Post-Rokkanian
reflections. Historical Social Research, 10(3), 2-18. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.10.1985.3.2-18
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-34804
- 2 -
OPEN VOTING IN PRUSSIA AND DENMARK, OR : THE COMPLEXITY OF COMPARISON.
SOME POST-ROKKANIAN REFLECTIONS(*)
Jorgen Elklit(+)
Abstract : One of the themes which occupied the late Stein
Rokkan in a number of his writings was the impact of
institutional changes on political development, especially
on the introduction of full-fledged democracy . In the late
fifties Stein Rokkan realized that the functions of va-
rious institutions, e .g. the safeguarding of the privacy
of the electoral act, for political systems could be
studied by way of comparison . The paper demonstrates that
it is not possible to follow Stein Rokkan's proposal and
carry out a systematic comparison of electoral systems
and, in particular, of the introduction of the secret vote
and its importance for mobilization and partisan choice in
Prussia, the German Reich, and Denmark in the relevant
period around the turn of the century.
INTRODUCTION
One of the themes which occupied the late Stein Rokkan in a number of his
writings was the impact of institutional changes on political development,
especially on the introduction of full-fledged democracy (e .g . Rokkan, 1970:
32)
This meant to Rokkan that both the development in a number of dimensions (in
particular : extensions of suffrage, weighting of votes, and privatization of
electoral preferences) and the sequencing of decisions crucial to political
development were to be studied . It also meant that comparisons could not
avoid becoming a central analytical tool - comparisons over time, between
systems, within systems, and between subsystems across systems.
In the late fifties Stein Rokkan realized that the functions of various
institutions, e .g . the safeguarding of the privacy of the electoral act, for
political systems could be studied by way of comparison . His reading of some
German authors in this period made him aware of the potential of comparing
the Prussian system with the Reich for studying some of the effects of open
voting as well as the unequal weighting of votes (Rokkan, 1961) . He and
Henry Valen had already then (Rokkan and Valen, 1960 : 114 ; reprinted 1983:
267) suggested that a three-cornered comparison of Denmark, Prussia, and the
German Reich should be carried out because that would be of the "greatest
interest in the functional analysis of electoral institutions" . The idea was
that it would be possible to contrast records of turnout and partisan choice
before and after the introduction of secrecy in the electoral systems and by
doing so one would be able to throw light on the functions of this institu-
tion in political life.
The intention of this paper is to discuss this proposal of Rokkan's in order
to see what kinds of problems the would-be analyst would confront.
(+) Address all communications to: Jorgen Elklit, Institute of Political
Science, University of Aarhus, Universitetsparken, DK-8000 Aarhus C .
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A central point for Rokkan was that the privatization of the voting act was
an integral part of a democratic system
. Most Western European countries had
however, made provisions for the secrecy of the vote before or - at least -
at the same time as suffrage was extended to the lower classes, and there-
fore the importance and functioning of this institution could only be stu-
died by looking at systems with open voting, i
.e . the public declaration of
one's electoral preferences
. Denmark and Prussia both had open voting as
well as a fairly extended suffrage, so it was obvious that they should be
included as cases in the study of the passing from open to secret voting as
a means to understanding the institution of secret voting (Rokkan, 1970:
32).
The two systems both had a long prevalence of open voting (1849-1900 and
1849-1918, respectively)
. This also speaks in favour of their suitability
for comparison
. Rokkan also stressed the comparable social structures of the
two countries
. Furthermore, one can mention the influence of Prussia when,
in 1848, the Danish electoral law was drafted
. This also indicates that a
comparison might be worthwhile
. It is particularly interesting, however, to
look at the period from 1893 (or maybe even later) to 1912/13
. Not until
then had the Danish Social Democratic Party its breakthrough, experiencing
continuously growing support at each election, and not until 1903 did the
Social Democrats in Prussia start to contest elections to the Abgeordneten-
haus in a more systematical way.
The comparison in question was thus obviously seen as an example of the so-
called most similar systems design" (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, 31-39;
Kristensen & Nannestad, 198o : 183 ff.) Kristensen & Nannestad argue that
this design is preferable when the idea of the comparison is to solve
problems of control (as it is here), while the most different systems
design" is to be used when the aim is the generation of universal (or non-
universal) hypotheses.
It should also be noticed that not until this period were Prussian electoral
statistics published in such detail that they can be used for analytical
purposes beyond the most simple ones
. The question of periodization is also
discussed by Schultze (198o : 81 f .).
The effects of the introduction of the secret vote, e
.g . on electoral par-
ticipation, can also be studied within individual systems
. In some cases
this might be the best way of solving many of the problems of control
. In
most cases, however, within-nation comparisons can only be carried out for
aggregates ; if control problems can be handled satisfactorily, such compari-
sons might be a useful basis for backward conclusions, from the situation
under secret to the situation under open voting (Elklit & Mitchell, 1983:
370 f : see also Bourke and DeBats, 1980 : 246). It should be recalled that
under certain circumstances it is also possible to compare the situations
before and after the introduction of secret vote at the individual level,
both as far as participation and partisan choice are concerned, as well as
to throw light on open voting as such (Elklit, 1982 ; 1983).
The purpose of this paper, however, is to submit Stein Rokkan's proposal to
a test in terms of an in-depth comparison between the three systems in
questions ; as a result, comparisons between systems will be central to the
argument that follows.
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Elements in the Prussian Electoral System
Since the Prussian 1849-system for elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus is
probably less well known than the two other systems, some of its central
features will be described here . Helpful reference works are Vogel et al.
(1971) and Ritter & Niehuss (1980) . For Denmark, see in particular Elklit
(1983) and Elklit & Mitchell (1983).
The Prussian system of 1849 was part of the reaction after 1848 when a
progressive electoral law had been carried through (v . Gerlach, 1908 ; Vogel
et al ., 1971). The Prussian electoral law of 1848 was even more democratic
than the Danish one of 1849, which is normally considered rather progres-
sive - considering the time, of course.
The changes in the Prussian law of 1849 were mainly (1) that secret voting
was abandoned and open voting was introduced, and (2) that voting was to
take place according to which of three tax groups or classes the voter
belonged. The system of indirect elections was not changed.
The election of electors took place in so-called Urwahlbezirke, i .e . small
polling districts constructed in such a way that each of them had between
75 0 and 1,749 inhabitants . Normally this corresponded to 160-340 voters . Tax
amounts in each polling district were then added up (the rules for this were
not exactly the same throughout the period), and those voters who together
paid the third of all taxes were then the first tax class, those who paid
the second third upper were the second tax class, and those who paid the
last third were the third and last tax class . In most cases, each of the
three classes of voters in a polling district elected the same number of
electors, one in the smaller districts, and two in the larger districts;
thus the larger districts had 6 electors.
The income distribution was so skewed that on the average 3-4 per cent of
the voters belonged to the first tax class, 10-12 per cent to the second,
and 84-85 per cent to the third and last tax class . Due to an even more
skewed income distribution in some parts of Prussia and in some of the
polling districts it was not uncommon to find only one voter in the first
tax class . He then appointed the elector (or even two electors in the larger
districts). It also sometimes occurred that the second tax class comprised
only one or two voters, so that he (or they) appointed one or two electors
for that class . The third tax class counted all the remaining voters, in
some cases n - 2 voters.
In all three classes the electoral decision system was that of absolute
majority, and if no such majority was found in the first round, a second
ballot was held with only the two leading contenders participating . If in
the second round they had exactly the same number of votes, the decision was
to be made by lot.
The election of electors in the polling districts was parallel to Danish
elections to the Folketing when - in Denmark - a second round was held
(Elklit, 1983 ; Elklit & Mitchell, 1983) . The main difference - apart from
the Prussian elections being indirect, the Danish direct - was that those in
Prussia were organized after the tax classes in small size polling districts
and in Denmark after municipalities, even though voting took place in one
central locality in the constituency . The voters in both cases stepped
forward, identified themselves to the returning officer, if he asked for it,
and said in a loud and clear voice who they voted for ; then the name of the
preferred candidate was entered in the manuscript electoral register next to
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the voter's name . Such lists from Prussia have been located in the pro-
vincial archives in Abend (now in Denmark) and in Schleswig, but of course
not in the central Prussian archives in Berlin
. A reduced copy of two pages
from the voting in the third tax class in the first polling district in the
town of Sonderborg (also now in Denmark) from the election of electors in
'898 is seen on the next pages.
When the electors were elected, they themselves had to elect the representa-
tive of the whole constituency
. This also took place in public by absolute
majority and more than one ballot if necessary to produce an absolute majo-
rity. The tax classes had no formal role to play at this stage, but they
were of course still important since the electors chosen by the rich voters
in the first class together with the electors elected by the well-to-do
voters in the second class could easily outweigh those elected by the voters
in the third class.
The following example shows how a representative was elected for Schleswig-
Holstein's third constituency, consisting of two administrative counties,
Stadtkreis Flensburg and Landkreis Flensburg, at the election of Autumn
1903 . In many respects the constituency was fairly representative, but it
has also been selected with an eye to the possibility of later comparisons
with other constituencies in the same region which do not share the same
characteristics.
The constituency consisted - as mentioned above - of two administrative
counties (Kreise)
. The number of voters in each tax class in the two counties
for all polling districts taken together is seen in Table 1
. The two polling
Table 1 .
	
Number of Voters etc. in the Constituency of Flensbourg at the
Election of Electors 1903
Administrative County
	
Administrative County
of Urban Flensbourg
	
of Rural Flensbourg
Number of 33 34
polling districts
Total number of electors 195 1 1632
Voters Voters
Abs . Pct . Electors Abs . Pct . Electors
Voters in 1st tax class 251 3 4 378 4 7
2nd tax class 862 9 13 1,017 11 18
3rd tax class 8,479 88 130 7,857 85 148
Total number of voters 9,592 100 49 9,252 100 57
Source: Official election statistics.
1) This means that 31 or 32 of the 33 polling districts had the maximum of six
electors.
2) This means that the average number of electors per district was 4 .8 . That
figure implies that the number of districts with five electors (two in tax
class 1, one in tax class 2, and two in tax class 3) was almost as high as the
number of districts with four electors (two in tax class 2 and one in the
other two tax classes). Therefore the distribution of electors in tax classes
does not influence the voter:electors ratio.
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districts had almost exactly the same number of polling districts (33 and
34), but there were more electors to be elected in the town, since the town
had more inhabitants and therefore more polling districts with six electors
each than the rural Kreis . The town also had relatively more voters in the
third tax classes because its income distribution was more skewed than was
the case in the countryside. The percentage of voters in the third tax class
of course varied from one polling district to another. Electoral participa-
tion in the tax classes is seen in Table 2.
Table 2.
	
Turnout at the Election of Electors 1903 in Flensbourg . Per Cent
Administrative County Administrative County
of Urban Flensbourg
	
of Rural Flensbourg
Turnout in 1st tax class 69 45
2nd tax class 55 29
3rd tax class 32 11
Total turnout 35 14
Source: Official election statistics.
Table 2 shows the same picture as can be seen in almost any other Prussian
constituency, i .e . very different turnout rates in the three tax classes -
from 69 per cent in the town's first tax class to a modest 11 per cent in
the third tax class in the countryside . Since voting took place locally in
the 67 small polling districts, no distance factor can have caused these
different turnout rates.
Published electoral statistics are not detailed enough to allow a close
scrutiny of the transformation from votes for the various parties and
candidates to the eventual election of one of them . One can, however, indicate
the size of the Social Democratic vote (Table 3) ; it should also be noted
that no Danish votes were cast in this election.
Table 3 . The Social Democratic Vote 1903 in the Constituency of Flensbourg
in each Tax Class. Percentage of Votes Cast
Administrative County Administrative County
of Urban Flensbourg
	
of Rural Flensbourg
Social Democratic votes in
1st tax class - -
2nd tax class 2 0
3rd tax class 50 17
Source: Official election statistics.
347 of the 358 electors were able to participate in the election of the
constituency's representative for the Abgeordnetenhaus. Published statistics
do not allow a distinction between electors from the various tax classes or
the two administrative counties . The National Liberal candidate in the first
round got 164 votes from the electors, the Free Conservative 144, and the
Social Democrat 37 . No candidate had an absolute majority, and therefore a
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second ballot was held between the two leading contenders
. In the second
round they both got exactly the same number of votes as in the first, 37
votes being declared invalid - obviously a Social Democratic demonstration
against the electoral system as such
. This meant that the National Liberal
candidate was elected to the Abgeordnetenhaus as representative for Schles-
wig-Holstein's third constituency.
1903 also witnessed an election to the Reichstag, the national parliament.
The Reichstag elections were direct elections in single member constituen-
cies with an absolute majority system, i .e . maybe two ballots
. The district-
ing was not the same as for elections to the Prussian parliament, since the
county (Kreis) of Abenra was added to the two Flensbourg counties to form
Schleswig-Holstein's second Reichstag constituency . Turnout in this election
was 71 per cent in the rural ditricts
. 77 per cent in Flensbourg itself,
and 8o per cent in the town of AbenrS, i
.e . much higher participation rates
than we saw in Table 2 for the open, indirect and unequal election of
electors . The Social Democrats now had as many as 5,743 votes (almost four
times as many as recorded in Table 3), and 78o Danish votes were also
recorded at this election - as compared to none at all in the election to
the Abgeordnetenhaus.
These very different turnout rates and very different results for various
parties and candidates make it of paramount importance to ask if it is
meaningful to compare the two kinds of elections
. One of the points to
consider is the many cases of non-congruent constituencies which call for
much more complicated recalculations than the above example in order to have
comparable units at the two levels.
Horst Nöcker of the Historical Commission of Berlin has, however, establi-
shed a data bank for the two 1903 elections as far as Prussia is concerned.
This data bank allows comparisons among almost identical units, i .e . he has
reshaped the constituencies from the elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus to
fit the Reichstag constituencies.
The difficulties met during such an undertaking are well-known and need not
be repeated here
. One has to accept this procedure and the inherent problems
if systematical studies of the interplay of social and political structures
at the two levels are on the agenda.
The Reichstag elections were - as mentioned above - direct elections in
single member constituencies with an absolute majority system, i
.e . mayby
two ballots ; they placed the voters in a situation where all the classical
problems about participation, tactical voting, etc
. had to be considered.
This, however, was almost nothing compared to the elections to the Prussian
Abgeordnetenhaus
. Here, the voters - in each tax class and each little
polling district - had to consider if they could have their preferred elec-
tor (or pair of electors) elected, but also - if they succeeded in that - if
their chosen elector(s) could contribute to the election of that representa-
tive who the voter eventually wanted to see elected
. It should be noticed
that in 1903 the average number of electors in a constituency was 2 94,
ranging from 132 to 3,558 . These considerations were of course of a rather
imprecise nature, but they were so to speak basically of a positive nature
("How can my preferred candidate eventually be elected?")
. They should,
however, be combined with much more negative reflections on the two sets of
risks connected with participating in open elections :
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1. What implications - socially, economically, and in relation to one's
career etc . - could it possible have to reveal one's true political
attitudes, if they were not the same as expected or hoped for by one's
social reference group or superiors? This should of course, on the other
hand, be balanced by the advantages this could bring in other social
circles.
2. What implications - of exactly the same negative nature - would follow
from defecting from voting, which some people might suppose was done in
order to conceal something? This should of course be weighted against
the advantages of voting quite straightforwardly - i .e . as ecpected.
Thus the individual voter had - at least in theory - to carry out an analy-
sis of relevant political and social structures as well as of issues,
candidates, attitudes, etc . and then make an overall evaluation of gains and
losses connected with voting in a certain way - or maybe not voting at all.
This means that it is very arguable that analysis of rational electoral
decisions-making might be a fruitful approach also in studies of elections
in a more remote past (Himmelweit et al ., 1981 : 112 ff ; Tonsgaard, 1984:
90-101 ; Popkin et al ., 1976 ; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974 ; Mitchell, 1979) .
Evert showed already at the publication of the election results (Erg . XXIII:
18) that participation rates were much higher in regions with linguistic,
i .e. national, minorities or, especially after 1908, a high proportion of
industrial workers - i .e. many Social Democrats (Erg . XXX: XIX ; Hirsch,
1908). This is an indication of the influence of social structural and
national-cultural relationships, and it also shows that the problems con-
nected with open voting as such were neglected, if and when the preferred
candidates had a good chance of being elected, or when it was considered
politically appropriate for other reasons . This reasoning is, of course, in
accordance with a number of points made by Tingsten in his work on political
behaviour ( 1 937) .
It does not follow, however, that the presence of national minorities of
some strength or a high percentage of industrial workers led automatically
to high turnout rates and heavy support for national minority parties or
candidates of the Social Democratic Party, respectively. Many other factors
were also influential - confessional, traditional, and others as well -
creating both at elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus and to the Reichstag a
much more complicated picture as far as participation and partisan choice
were concerned (see for instance Rohe, 1981) . For this reason it is diffi-
cult - to say the very least - to give a coherent and satisfactory picture
of the central features of the Prussian and German electoral systems and
electoral behaviour in this period.
The outline presented above of the Flensbourg case in 1903 was mainly inten-
ded to show some general features of the system in a fairly typical cons-
tituency ; this does not mean that it should be considered the representative
Prussian constituency.
So far four analytical dimensions have been introduced, and they will be
used in Table 4 below where the considerations presented are summarized
schematically. The four dimensions are:
Open versus secret voting;
indirect versus direct voting;
low versus high degree of politization of elections;
unequal versus equal voting rights .
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Table 4
.
	
Comparison of Turnout (in per cent) Around the Turn of the Centuryin the three Systems
. Four Analytical Dimensions
Only 6 of the 16 cells in Table 4 can be filled in . One thing that this
table does show is that, due to the number of analytical dimensions, it is
rather doubtful if these electoral systems, can be compared directly
. But if
it is done, nevertheless, then the conclusion is straightforward : The com-
bined effect on participation of the unequal voting right and the indirect
way of election to the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus (and, related to this, also
on partisan choice) was indeed considerable, especially when the degree of
politization was low
. The combined effect of these two factors is so strong
that the question of open versus secret voting loses some of the importance
that it otherwise has . So one therefore has to ask if we can compare this
Prussian electoral system with other electoral systems in any meaningful way
- especially when the focus is mainly to look at open versus secret voting
in order to throw light on the importance of electoral secrecy for political
development.
It is of course necessary to look at those constituencies where some mobili-
zation had taken place - as indicated by the proportion of voters partici-
pating - for instance more than 5o per cent
. Only in these constituencies
would it be meaningful to look for patterns between elections in the Reich
and in Prussia or to look for connections between structural factors and the
behaviour of voters. If data from all constituencies were brought into such
an analysis, a not negligible number of constituencies would have to be
excluded from the analysis
. The reason for this exclusion would be a very
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low participation rate at both elections
. If, e .g ., a Prussian constituency
had 10 per cent of its voters participating in a given election and its
corresponding Reichstag constituency had 6o per cent participating in the
next national election, it would - at least theoretically - be a possibility
that not one single voter from one type of election did also participate in
the other type of election.
A scrutiny of all constituencies reveals that only regions with high
concentration of the Polish minority, i.  Western Prussia, Posen, and Silesia
systematically had high participation rates in this period, while the par-
ticipation rate in very few other constituencies (in Berlin, Northern
Schleswig, and a few other places) did pass the 5o per cent mark for the
most numerous class of voters, the third class.
This picture does not change if one takes all the three classes together:
Going through Prussian electoral statistics makes it possible to conclude
that less than 10 per cent of all constituencies had a turnout of more than
50 per cent when all three tax classes are taken together (as a weighted
sum) . Almost all constituencies with a turnout above the 50 per cent mark
were Polish-dominated . Towards the end of the period, however, there is a
tendency for this figure to increase.
By concentrating on the most politizised of the Prussian constituencies, the
problem of comparability can be reduced . It was still open, unequal, and
indirect elections which had high participation rates only if there were
strong national minorities (i .e . in the main where such minorities were
local majorities) or a strong working class movement, and as a consequence
of such social structural factors a considerable social pressure which
helped the voters to overcome the pressure against voting "anti-system"
(Parking, 1967; Himmelweit et al ., 1981 : 13,113).
In order to get a better understanding of a constituency with high turnout
in the election of electors, the constituency of Haderslev (Schleswig-
Holstein's first constituency for elections to the Abgeordnetenhaus) has
also been looked at . Normally, this constituency had the highest turnout of
the constituencies in Northern Schleswig . Again the data used here concern
the 1903 election.
There probably is no need to go into details as far as polling districts,
number of electors, tax classes, etc . are concerned. Table 5 shows the
partisan division at the election of electors (EE) in 1903 . The table also
gives the results of the Reichstag elections (RE) 1902-07 as well as the
1908 election of electors in order to have a base line for comparisons. The
German parties are placed together, in one group only ; it should be noted
that the 1902 and 1906 elections were by-elections . All votes not explicitly
registered as either Danish or Social Democratic are counted as German.
Table 5 shows a high turnout both in the rural and the urban parts of the
constituency at all four elections to the Reichstag. It reveals a stable
following for the Danish candidates at the same four elections to the
Reichstag, and also shows a marked difference between the rural and urban
parts of the constituency.
If we then look at the open, unequal, and indirect elections of electors, we
find a substantially lower turnout : In the town of Haderslev itself as much
as 35-40 per cent lower, in the rural districts on the average 20 per cent
lower - and this in one of the constituencies with the highest turnout in
all Prussia!
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Table 5 .
	
Turnout and Party Strength at Elections 1902-08 in the County of
Haderslev, Separately for the Town and the Countryside . Per Cent
of all Voters
RE RE EE RE RE EE
1902 1903 1903 1906 1907 1908
A . Haderslev
Danish 27 28 29 29 9German 47 46 48 45 47 34Social Democratic 8 9 9 9 1
Total (= turnout) 82 83 48 83 85 44
Voters 1,722 1,671 1,748 1,683 1,740 1,853
B . The Countryside
Danish 59 59 44 59 60 52German 23 22 17 23 24 15
Social Democratic 1 2 - 2 2 -
Total (= turnout) 83 83 61 84 86 67
Voters
	
ca .
	
9,666 10,187 9,135 10,175 10,203 9,678
Source: Official election statistics; Hansen, 1938; Lassen, 1976.
Note : Differences between number of voters at the different elections are due
to differing eligibility regulations
. Voting age at the election of electors
was 24, at the Reichtag elections 25
. The constituency also included
Sonderborg at Reichtag-elections; Sonderborg-figures are excluded here.
The "Danishness" of the constituency is a main factor in explaining the low
German voting figure in the rural districts and for 1908 in Haderslev it-
self
. In the countryside it is natural to consider it a consequence of the
open voting system
. However, the effect is more visible in the town, where a
little more than one quarter of the voters chose the Danish alternative at
the secret Reichstag elections, while nobody in 1903, and only 9 per cent in
1908, publicly admitted that they identified with the Danes
.(1) Exactly the
same picture emerges as far as the Social Democratic voters are concerned.
The costs - social as well as other - connected with voting for a Danish
candidate at the election of electors were so considerable in Haderslev
itself that they obviously kept many potential Danish voters back
. This was
probably also caused by the fact that everybody in the town knew that the
Danish majority in the countryside eventually would ensure the election of
the Danish candidate
. The same picture is seen at the parallel elections in
Abend and Tonder, but not in Sonderborg.
Comparisons within the, confines of individual constituencies illustrate that
open voting per se probably had an influence of its own on turnout and/or
partisan choice, even in constituencies with a high turnout
. This makes it
all the more important to combine analyses at the system level with analyses
at lower levels to see if conclusions reached at higher levels also hold at
the lower levels
. This is especially important in a German context since
regional and local variations make it difficult to reach conclusions which
hold across time and space (see, e .g ., Schultze, 1980: 83 ; Rohe, 1981).
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If one agrees with Himmelweit and her associates (1981) and sees the voters'
decision as dependent on three sets of factors - attitudinal, traditional,
and social - then we have found that the social factors (together with
politico-strategical considerations) were the most influential at the open
election of electors in the three towns mentioned above
. They made a con-
siderable proportion of the Danish group abstain, who at Reichstag elections
were influenced to vote for the Danish candidate by attitudinal and tradi-
tional factors.
In the context of this arguments is it not decisive if one can tell how this
pressure, this influence, was exerted on some voters . Sometimes the social
pressure against voting Danish was exerted in a most subtle way - at other
occasions it certainly was less subtle . It is well known from the literature
and the press that Prussian civil servants tried to influence the Danish-
identifying population in various ways because they themselves had been
under pressure to have the following of the anti-system parties minimized as
much as possible . And discussions in public - both in Berlin and locally all
over Prussia - must have made it understood by even the most slow-witted
that to vote otherwise than the way the State wanted involved certain risks.
There is some reason to suppose that this pressure by far exceeded what was
seen Danish open elections in the same period.
There has been a tendency to look at the influence of civil servants mainly
in connection with elections to the Reichstag, i.e . in connection with
secret elections, even though the system with ballot papers distributed in
advance made secrecy somewhat illusory (Lassen, 1976) . It seems obvious too
that the exertion of influence must have been much more widespread at the
open elections of electors . It is in any case not difficult to find records
in the Prussian Secret State Archive (Geheime Staatsarchiv) in Berlin -
especially for the areas where the Polish minority lived - which demons-
trates very obviously the keen interest in the functioning of the electoral
system at all administrative levels (including the government) . These re-
cords also demonstrate that the consequences of both the open voting and of
the partitioning of the voters in the three tax classes were fully under-
stood and appreciated . Indirect voting was not considered an element of the
same importance for the electoral system.
These questions were discussed quite often in the Abgeordnetenhaus, when
various electoral reforms were proposed, when mandates were approved, or
when election complaints came on (Verhandl .d .Hauses d .Abg., various years).
CONCLUSION
The above discussion has - as I see it - demonstrated that it is not pos-
sible to follow Stein Rokkan's proposal and carry out a systematic compari-
son of electoral systems and, in particular, of the introduction of the
secret vote and its importance for mobilization and partisan choice in
Prussia, the German Reich, and Denmark in the relevant period around the
turn of the century.
The main reason for this negative result is the small number of cases and
the fact that the systems in question vary along too many central analytical
dimensions ; in particular the combination of unequal voting rights and
indirect elections - found only in Prussia - was a factor of considerable
importance.
Case studies of a few selected localities in Northern Schleswig - one of the
Prussian regions best suited for analysis because turnout here was not too
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low - have further demonstrated that open voting itself under certain cir-
cumstances could be a factor of considerable significance for the voter's
decision
. But even in these cases it is not fruitful to go on to comparisons
with pre-19o1 election figures from Danish localities.
Nevertheless, one can argue that both difference in turnout between elec-
tions to the Reichstag and the Abgeordnetenhaus and the records in the
official archives clearly demonstrate that the pressure on the voters as to
how they should vote was much stronger in Prussia than in Denmark . This
means that the openness of elections was utilized much more directly and
consciously in Prussia and that, consequently, the introduction of the
secret vote would have much more significance in that system than in Den-
mark.
Even though the argument of this paper has been that a comparison of the
three systems along the lines proposed by Rokkan is not advisable, then the
initial
.problem still remains : What impact did the privatization of the
electoral act - considered to be a major institutional change - have on
political development?
An obvious thing to do would be to reduce the number of analytical dimen-
sions trying in this way to address the problem of more variables than
cases
. But the number of cases would under all circumstances be too small,
and the process would probably involve an oversimplification of matters
which would limit the use of the results.
The only way out of this impasse seems to be a shift to another analytical
level, i .e
. from comparisons between systems to comparisons within systems.
It should be possible to find enough comparable cases within each of the
systems in question to solve the problems of control reasonably well (for an
example, see Elklit & Mitchell, 1983 : 371, as well as Table 5 above).
It might then be that the overall pattern from the analysis within one
system of change from open to secret voting, controlling for as many factors
as considered necessary, would parallel results from the analyses of other
systems, where one maybe would not find it necessary to control for exactly
the same factors.
This mode of comparison - i
.e . comparison across systems of within-system
results and patterns - might be the only way to tackle the problem of
comparing some rather important aspects of political development in Prussia,
the German Reich, and Denmark, as Stein Rokkan urged us to do.
FOOTNOTES
* This article is a slightly revised version of a paper prepared for the
workshop on "Models in the Comparative Study of Political Systems", ECPR
Joint Sessions of Workshops, Barcelona, Spain, March 25-30, 1985
. The
study was made possible by a grant from the Historical Commission of
Berlin for which I am very grateful.
1 No effort was made to see if the 5 per cent registered in 1903 as having
voted for candidates or unknown political standpoint (Erg
. XXIII : 227)
were Danish, since even that would not have changed the above conclusion
.
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Archival Records Used
A. Preussisches Geheime Staatsarchiv (Prussian Secret State Archive), Ber
lin-Dahlem
Pr. Staats-Ministerium, Rep . 90, A, VIII, sa, 1, Nr . 306
Pr . Min .des Auswärtigen, 111 . Hauptabt ., Nr
. 1431, 1433
B. Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein (Regional Archive of Schleswig-Hol-
stein), Schloss Gottorf, Schleswig
Abt
. 301, Nr . 804 1-3, Abg .Haus, all .gem . 1898-1913
Abt . 309, Nr . 8345, Landtags- und Reichstagswahlen 1 893-1913
Abt . 309, Nr . 22793 and 22860, Abg .wahl im . Wahlkreis-Hadersleben-
1882 . Verhandlungen und Urwahlprotokolle, Band 2
Abt . 320, Hadersleben, Nr . 36, Stimmverhältnisse 1 893-94
Abt . 320, Hadersleben, Nr . 39, Verhandlungen über die Wahl eines Abg.
1879
Abt . 320, Hadersleben, Nr . 83, Landtagswahl 1913
Abt . 320, Apenrade, Nr. 89, Wahlangelegenheiten 1875-1908
C. Landsarkivet for de sonderjyske Landsdele (Regional Archive of North
Schleswig), Abendbend Landrgdsarkiv
D .B . Nr . 1,2,3,3a,4,6,6a,6b,8,8a-c
Haderslev-Landradsarkiv
Fag 53, Nr . 2 and 7
Sdnderborg Landradsarkiv
Nr . 2189-90, 2192-95, 2197, 2199, 2201-02
Titel I1, Section 3, Nr . 82, 84, 91
Tonder Landradsarkiv
D. 13-19, 40.
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